This paper checks the effect of foreign aid on terrorism-foreign direct investment (FDI) nexus, while considering the extent of domestic corruption control (CC). The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 78 developing countries. The following findings were established: the negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in countries with higher levels of CC; foreign aid dampens the negative effect of terrorism on FDI only in countries with high level of CC. Also, the result is mixed when foreign aid is subdivided into its bilateral and multilateral components. While our findings are in accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse effect of terrorism on FDI, we find that multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of other forms of terrorism that can neither be classified as domestic or transnational. Policy implications are discussed in the paper.
Introduction
The notion that development assistance is required to help curb the adverse effect of terrorism on foreign direct investment (FDI) flow to developing country is conventionally accepted. This is following the submissions that aid is required for counterterrorism effort in terrorism-afflicted countries since they are poor and lack vital economic resources (Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2014) . After all, foreign aid bolsters a developing country's proactive counterterrorism effort and provides finance against transnational and domestic terrorism (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, & Younas, 2011; Lee, 2015) . As well known, terrorist incidence involve threats and violence by some individuals or sub-national groups against non-combatants, and has far-reaching effects such as, increasing the risk and cost of investment, infrastructural damages, reduction in economic output and savings, trade losses and higher insurance premium (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011; Enders, Sachsida, & Sandler, 2006; Keefer & Loayza, 2008; Sandler & Enders, 2008; Younas, 2015) .
In developing countries, however, the extent to which foreign aid can effectively help in counterterrorism effort will be met with different institutional and governance challenges.
As argued in literature, the institutional structure in respective developing countries (especially the condition of corruption) may likely determine the extent of the government's effort targeted towards the original intention of receiving such foreign aid. Economides, Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos (2008) , for instance, provides a theoretical explanation in the light of the distorting effect of foreign aid on private incentives of recipient country's government. The authors argue that foreign aid inflow pushes self-interested officials away from productive work to rent-seeking and resource extraction behaviour. Other authors perceive rent-seeking behaviour in corrupt countries as winning a 'contestable prize' with economic rewards, and foreign aid flow will only increase the size of the 'contestable prize' (see Economides et al., 2008; Svensson, 2000) . Building on this framework, it implies that the extent to which foreign aid is effective in funding recipient governments' counterterrorism effort will be conditional on the prevailing level of corruption in the recipient country.
By testing the conditioning effect of corruption control (CC) on the relationship between foreign aid flow, foreign investment outcome and terrorism, this paper advance the findings in Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011) that found that foreign aid inflow reduces the adverse effect of terrorism on FDI inflow to developing countries. Using similar data for 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008, a dynamic model was estimated for foreign aid, which is categorised as total, bilateral, and multilateral aid, and terrorism, measured as total, domestic, transnational, and unclear terrorism. Our results include that foreign aid dampens the negative effect of terrorism on foreign investment in only those countries with higher CCs. However, when foreign aid is subdivided into its bilateral and multilateral components, we find in accordance with the stance in literature that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse impact of transnational terrorism. We also find that multilateral aid is effective at mitigating the adverse impact of domestic terrorism on FDI, and that multilateral aid also curbs the adverse effect of transnational terrorism on FDI. Multilateral aid is also effective in decreasing the adverse effect of unclear and total terrorisms on FDI.
Our finding is relevant for developing countries based on the need to promote aid effectiveness and not just have a blanket proposal that foreign aid is an effective instrument for counterterrorism efforts in developing countries. Studies like Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011) and Lee (2015) have made outstanding contributions by empirically justifying how foreign aid can help curb the adverse effect of terrorism on FDI. The conclusion of these studies is one side of the coin. The other side is how effective can aid be considering the institutional environment in aid recipient countries, which is an important determinant of the effectiveness of aid. We condition foreign aid flow on the prevailing institutional environment to determine the effect of terrorism on foreign investment in order to propagate the narrative that aid effectiveness for counterterrorism effort will only be as effective as the prevailing institutional structure in the recipient countries. In addition, our study provides substantive policy conclusions that can be applicable for allocating or monitoring aid flow to developing countries for counterterrorism efforts. Noting that most developing countries are challenged by prevailing corrupt leadership (Asongu, 2013a (Asongu, , 2013b Efobi, 2014; Jo-Ansie, 2007; Kim, 2013; Olken & Pande, 2011) , therefore, recommending a 'blanket' foreign aid increase as a remedying tool for counterterrorism financing may not be sustainable, and may not have a long-lasting effect. Our study highlights the need to consider the corruption level in countries before aid allocation by conditioning our estimated results based on low or high corrupt countries.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing research that considers the interaction between country' institutional structure and foreign aid, and its effect on the relationship between terrorism and foreign investment. At best, the existing research on institutions and terrorism confirms that a strong institutional has a negative effect on different categories of terrorism (see Asongu, Tchamyou, Asongu, & Tchamyou, 2017) . The literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid is also lacking substantive conclusion on the interaction between countries' corruption level and foreign aid effectiveness to reduce the outcome of violence. The debate in the foreign aid literature has largely focused on the bidirectional relationship between institutional structure and foreign aid flow (e.g. Alesina & Weder, 1999; Knack, 2001; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Svensson, 2000; Tavares, 2003) . Further evidence in the aid literature has also considered foreign aid flow impact on terrorism (see Azam & Delacroix, 2006; Azam & Thelen, 2010; Bapat, 2011) . The notable studies that we identified, even when considering foreign aid, foreign investment and terrorism literature, include Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011) and Lee (2015) . Yet, the conclusions in these studies did not provide clear answers to the research issues that are discussed in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, the research method is discussed, including the variables and data, and the empirical strategy. Second, the empirical analysis is reported and the results are discussed. The fourth section concludes the paper with policy implications.
Research Method

Variables and Data
Consistent with data from Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011) , three-year non-overlapping intervals starting from 1984 to 2008 was gathered for 78 developing countries. The data period was motivated to advance the estimation of the underlining study. The three-year nonoverlapping intervals data format was motivated to improve the panel balancing. Also, this kind of data is important in ensuring a symmetric relationship between the variables of interest considering that terrorism occurrences, for instance, are time invariant events. Thus, its occurrences follow a stochastic trend and its variability will likely be low. Therefore a non-overlapping average will create a symmetric trend for our kind of analysis.
The main explained variable is the volume of FDI 1 measured as the percentage of the net FDI flows to GDP (FDI/GDP). Terrorism variable includes measurement for domestic, transnational, unclear, and total terrorism. Total terrorism is the incidence of terrorism that is a summation of both the domestic, transnational and unclear terrorism. Domestic terrorism includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involve the nationals of the venue country; implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue country. Transnational terrorism includes those acts of terrorism that 1 According to the 2013 definition of UNCTAD, FDI includes associates and subsidiaries, and consist of the net sales of shares and loans to the parent company plus the parent firm's share of the affiliatés reinvested earnings plus total net intracompany loans. FDI flows also include the increase in reinvested earnings plus the net increase in funds received from the foreign direct investor. FDI flows with a negative sign (reverse flows) indicate that at least one of the components in the above definition is negative and not offset by positive amounts of the remaining components (see definition in http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI-Flows.aspx).
concern at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters, and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victims and targets are from another country. Unclear terrorism constitutes those incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism. The terrorism data is an annual event data of terrorist activities, which is domiciled in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. The motivation of employing different terrorism indicators is to avail more room for policy implications. Foreign aid is another important variable in our study. Our foreign aid variable is classified into two groups -bilateral and multilateral aid flow. These classifications are motivated to take into consideration the debate in the aid literature on the differential impact of these types of aid on economic outcomes (see Asiedu, Jin, & Nandwa, 2009; Caselli & Feyrer, 2007; Harms & Lutz, 2006; Kimura & Todo, 2010; Selaya & Sunesen, 2012) . Interested readers can consider the cited literature for more exposition. More so, just like the inclusion of different indicators of terrorism, the foreign aid indicators were also included for robust policy conclusions.
Four control variables were included in our analysis following the literature on the determinant of foreign investment inflow (e.g. Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu & Lien, 2011) . They include the GDP growth rate, trade openness, inflation rate and number of telephone users per 100 people. The inclusions of the control variables are justified as follows. GDP growth rate, for instance, reflects the income level of the FDI host country and thus shows the extent of the return of investment for foreign investors. Trade openness measures the extent to which a country's economy is opened to investment and trade. In essence, some forms of investment, especially those that are export oriented are favoured by an opened economy (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011) . Inflation rate reflects the specific macroeconomic shocks that are existent in the country, and it is an important determinant of FDI location (Asiedu & Lien, 2011) . The number of telephone users per 100 people is an indicator of the extent of infrastructural development in the country. This variable is an indicator of the level of infrastructural development in the FDI host country (Asiedu, 2006) . These four indicators are some of the consistent determinants of foreign investment in developing countries, and they are sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
The conditioning variable (i.e. CC) measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010) . This variable is not directly included in the model, but it was used to condition the relationship between foreign aid, terrorism and FDI at different CC thresholds. The median value was used as the threshold to enable comparative sample sizes for low and high CC sub-samples. Consistent with Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) , the impact of the modifying variable is interpreted as a marginal effect. The CC variable was obtained from World Governance Indicators. Table 1 presents the variable definition and some summary statistics. On average, countries within the data set suffered about 18.58 total terrorist attacks per year, while domestic, transnational, and unclear terrorist attacks were 14.29, 2.32, and 1.97 attacks per year. FDI was only 2.494 of the GDP of the sampled countries, while total foreign aid flow logged value was 5.55, with bilateral aid flow (5.18) being more than multilateral aid (4.16). The CC value on the average was −0.295, which is lower than the threshold for good CC (i.e. 0.00). The average GDP growth rate was 3.852, with a standard deviation of 3.467. This implies that the sampled countries are similar in terms of economic growth. The value of the average trade openness, infrastructure, and inflation rate was 4.118, 1.475, and 2.414. These values are in their logarithmic form to reduce the distributions' skewness.
The pairwise correlations to check the bivariate association between the variables are presented in Table 2 . From a preliminary assessment, only the terrorism and foreign aid variables are highly correlated, respectively. These correlations do not pose a problem for our analysis considering that the variables were not combined in single regression estimation.
Estimation Strategy
The following equations in levels (Equation (1)) and difference (Equation (2)) summarises the estimable model. Where the time and country identifiers are represented by 't' and 'i', respectively. From the model, FDI is Foreign Direct Investment; A, Foreign aid; T, Terrorism; AT, interaction between Foreign aid (A) and Terrorism (T); GDPg, GDP growth; Trade, Trade Openness; Infra, Infrastructure; Infla, Inflation; η i is a country-specific effect; ξ t is a time-specific constant; and ε i,t an error term. The two-step procedure is preferred to the one-step alternative in the model specification because it corrects for issues of heteroscedasticity that may likely arise from the estimable data. The adopted panel System GMM estimation strategy employs forward orthogonal deviations, instead of first differencing. Accordingly, preference is given to the Roodman (2009a Roodman ( , 2009b extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because in the presence of crosssectional dependence, the use of forward orthogonal deviations produces more efficient estimates (Baltagi, 2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006) .
Presentation of Empirical Results
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present results corresponding to bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid respectively. All tables are structured in two panels. While Panel A presents results on domestic and transnational terrorisms, Panel B shows the findings corresponding to unclear and total terrorisms. The median of CC is used as the threshold. Hence, three regressions are required for every specification to assess the baseline effect, impact when CC is lower or equal to the median, and the effect when CC is higher than the median. For all tables, panels and terrorism dynamics, the first set (second set) of specifications is without (with) control variables.
The information criteria across panels and specifications broadly confirm the validity of the models. The null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR2) in difference is rejected for the most part. Likewise, the null hypothesis of the Sargan (Hansen) test for over-identification is also overwhelmingly rejected in the most part. This confirms the validity of the instruments. It should be noted that while the Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test is not robust and not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR test is robust and weakened by instruments. We have ensured that in the specifications, the number of instruments is lower than the number of cross-sections, to mitigate instrument proliferation or restrict over-identification. The Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments confirms the validity of the Hansen OIR results. The Fisher tests for joint validity of estimated coefficients are consistently valid across specifications and panels.
We first discuss results that are broadly consistent with all tables, before engaging tablespecific outcomes. First, the negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in the sample with higher levels of CC. In the same spirit, the foreign aid flow dampens the negative effect of terrorism on FDI only in the sample with higher levels of CC. The result is mixed when foreign aid is subdivided into bilateral and multilateral aid. While our findings are in accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse impact of transnational terrorism (see Right Hand Side (RHS) of Panel A in Table 3 ), the position that only multilateral aid is effective in mitigating the adverse impact of domestic terrorism on FDI is not confirmed since multilateral aid also curbs the adverse effect of transnational terrorism on FDI (see RHS of Panel A in Table 4 ). Multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of unclear and total terrorisms on FDI (see Panel B of Table 4 ). Observations  514  300  214  483  284  199  514  300  214  483  284  199 Notes: *, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Fisher 40.12*** 33.66*** 83.52*** 57.80*** 34.80*** 168.7*** 32.37*** 35.28*** 41.07*** 33.46*** 32.10*** 47.18*** I n s t r u m e n t s 2 1 1 9 2 1 3 7 3 5 3 7 2 1 1 9 2 1 3 7 3 5 3 7 C o u n t r i e s 7 8 6 8 7 5 7 7 6 7 7 1 7 8 6 8 7 5 7 7 Observations  520  306  214  487  288  199  520  306  214  487  288  199 Notes: *, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. This finding agrees with Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011) in some form. For instance, foreign aid dampens the effect of terrorism on foreign investment is valid for the sub-sample in which CC levels are high (or above the median). The positive effect of domestic terrorism on FDI is higher when CC levels are low in specifications without control variables. This tendency is broadly consistent with unclear and total terrorisms in Panel B. The threshold point at which the modifying variable or 'bilateral aid' mitigates the adverse effect of transnational terrorism is within range. Accordingly: 6.666(0.140/0.021) is within the maximum range of 8.362 disclosed in the summary statistics. There is also an overwhelming evidence of convergence across specifications and panels. The maximum rate of convergence is 27.06% per annum [pa (0.812/3)], while the minimum rate is 18.46% [pa (0.554/3)]. With the exceptions of first specifications without control variables for domestic, transnational and total terrorisms, the convergence rate is slightly slower in countries with higher CC levels. It is important to note that the information criterion for the establishment of significance is when the absolute value of the lagged endogenous variable is situated between 0 and 1.
In the computation of the convergence rate, three divides the lagged value because we have used three-year non-overlapping intervals to mitigate short-run or business cycle disturbances. The interested reader can find more information on the computation of convergence rates (in presence of data averages) in recent convergence literature, notably: Asongu (2013c) and Asongu (2014b) . Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. While trade openness and GDP growth intuitively increase FDI, low and stable inflation are significant positive boosts to FDI location decisions. It should be noted that the mean of inflation is 2.414.
Like in Table 3 , we find in Table 4 that the positive effect of domestic terrorism on FDI is higher when CC levels are low, especially in specifications without control variables. This tendency is broadly consistent with unclear and total terrorisms in Panel B respectively for specifications with and without control variables. Threshold points at which multilateral aid mitigates the adverse effects of terrorism are broadly within range, with the slight exception of domestic terrorism.
Focusing on domestic terrorism, it is 8 (0.008/0.001) and not within range because the maximum in the range is 7.105. With respect to transnational terrorism, 7.1 (0.071/0.010) is just within the limits of the maximum range (or 7.105). For unclear terrorism, 4.73 (0.71/0.15) is within range and 7 (0.007/0.001) is also within range for total terrorism. Regarding evidences of convergence, the following can be established: the maximum rate of convergence is 27.36% (0.821/3) pa, while the minimum rate is 16.76% pa (0.503/3). This is only applicable with the exceptions of first specifications without control variables for domestic, unclear and total terrorisms. The convergence rate is slightly slower in countries with higher CC levels. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.
In addition to the explanations provided for the effects of GDP growth and trade openness earlier discussed, two more interesting new patterns are worth discussing. First, trade openness and GDP growth have negative (positive) effects in the sub-sample with low (high) CC levels. This is consistent with intuition and the predictions of economic theory. Accordingly, the presence of low levels of CC could potentially dissuade FDI, even in the presence of burgeoning economic growth and trade (Musila & Sigué, 2007 . Second, there is a slight exception of infrastructure having a negative effect of FDI in the LHS of Panel B. The argument for this effect is not very strong because it is significant at the 10% level. However, a possible explanation may be the use of mobile phone applications for activities that discourages FDI in the sub-sample with high CC levels. This interpretation should be treated with caution because the argument is not consistently significant across samples and panels.
From Table 5 on total aid, the positive effect of terrorism is higher in the sub-sample with low CC levels, which is consistent with evidence from the preceding tables. While this is the case only in specifications without control variables for unclear terrorism (and specifications with control variables for domestic and total terrorisms), it is not the case in either specification for transnational terrorism. With the exception of domestic terrorism, for which total aid does not mitigate its adverse effect on FDI, threshold points at which total aid reduces the negative impacts of terrorism are broadly within range. For transnational terrorism, it is 6.60 (0.152/0.023), which is within the range of between 0.800 and 8.495. Unclear terrorism is 6 (0.072/0.012), which is also within range. Also, 8 (0.008/0.001) are within range for total terrorism.
With regard to evidence of convergence, the following are observed from Table 5 . The maximum rate of convergence is 28.33% (0.850/3) pa, while the minimum rate is 18.46% pa (0.554/3). This is with the exceptions of the first specifications without control variables for all dynamics of terrorism. The convergence rate is slightly slower in countries with higher CC levels. Finally, the discussion relevant to the signs of the significant control variables is consistent with those pertaining to Tables 3 and 4 on bilateral and multilateral aid respectively.
We have observed that the threshold point at which the modifying foreign aid variables are within their respective ranges, with the slight exception of the effect of multilateral aid, decreases the adverse effect of domestic terrorism. A resulting policy implication is that more multilateral aid may be needed to combat the negative effect of domestic terrorism on FDI in countries with CC levels that are above the median. The employment of this range is important in order to provide economic significance to interactive estimated coefficients since overall interpretations are based on marginal effects. Moreover, given that most of the thresholds are just close to the upper limit or maximum of the range, it implies that more development assistance is needed to reap more benefits from the mitigating role of foreign aid. It should be noted that the closeness of the threshold to the upper limit imply that only a few sampled countries enjoy the dampening role of foreign aid in the effect of terrorism dynamics on FDI. Hence, more foreign aid is required to make these benefits more accessible.
The rate of convergence is between 18.46% and 27.06%, 16.76% and 27.36%, and 18.46% and 28.33% per annum in specifications with bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid respectively. This implies that corresponding time to full convergence is respectively between 16.25 years (yrs) (300%/18.46%)and11.08 yrs (300%/27.06%), 17.89 yrs (300%/16.76%) and 10.96 yrs (300%/27.36%), 16.25 yrs (300%/18.46%) and 10.58 (300%/28.33%). The interested reader can find more insights into the computations of full convergence in Asongu (2013c Asongu ( , 2014b .
We have also broadly established that, with the exception of the first specifications, which do not include the control variables, the rate of convergence is slightly lower in countries with higher CC levels. This implies that the presence of more variables in the conditioning information set leads to a lower degree of catch-up among countries with higher levels of CC. In other words, changes in cross-country institutional and structural differences on which conditional convergence are based are less apparent in the presence of more control variables for high CC countries. This interpretation should be treated with caution because conditional convergence is contingent on the variables we chose and empirically test, which may not necessarily reflect all cross-country institutional and structural difference needed for conditional convergence to occur.
Conclusions and Further Directions
We set out to extend Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011) study by conditioning the mitigation effect of foreign aid, terrorism and FDI on CC levels. Using the System GMM estimation technique on a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008, we establish that the negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in countries with higher levels of CC. Foreign aid dampens the negative effect of terrorism on FDI only in higher levels of CC. The result is mixed when aid is subdivided into its bilateral and multilateral component. While our findings are in accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse impact of transnational terrorism, the position that only multilateral aid is effective in mitigating the adverse impact of domestic terrorism on FDI is not confirmed because multilateral aid also curbs the adverse effect of transnational terrorism on FDI. Moreover, multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of unclear and total terrorisms on FDI.
Specifically, we also observe from our estimation that the effect of terrorism on FDI has been established to be positive, with a higher magnitude in the sub-samples with lower CC. A logical implication is that some terrorism dynamics may not deter FDI location decisions especially in countries experiencing low levels of institutional governance (in terms of CC). This implies that the prevailing institutional structure may matter more for FDI despite the incidence of terrorism and this is likely tied to the confidence of FDI in the government's ability to protect their interest as well as defeat the prevailing encumbrance.
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